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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
SIRIUS LC, a Wyoming Limited Liability Company, 
BRYCE H. ERICKSON, and any person claiming under by or through Bryce H. Erickson in and 
to the real property described as follows: 
CARIBOU COUNTY, IDAHO: 
TOWNSHIP 5 SOUTH, RANGE 46 E.B.M., 
SECTION 27: LOTS 1 AND 2, N112 
NWII4, EXCEPT THEREFROM THE S % 
NEl14 NW % NWII4, 
Supreme Court Docket No. 36466-2009 
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF ON APPEAL 
Appeal from the District Court of the Sixth Judicial District for Caribou County. 
Honorable Mitchell W. Brown, District Judge, presiding. 
Bryan D. Smith, Esq., residing at Idaho Falls, Idaho, for Appellant, Bryce H. Erickson 
A. Brnce Larson, Esq., residing at Pocatello, Idaho, for Respondent, Sirius LC 
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COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS AND STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Ericlcson generally agrees with Sirius' characterization of the facts and course of 
proceedings. However, Erickson does take one particular exception. To support its claim 
that this Court in Sirius Ihas already determined that Bagley provided consideration for 
the promissory note, Sirius has seized upon dicta from this Court where it said the 
following: 
Erickson requested Bagley's representation in a Chapter 12 proceeding. 
Bagley agreed to represent Erickson if he would sign a promissory note payable 
to Sirius, secured by a real estate mortgage. Erickson requested Bagley's 
representation for his own benefit and signed the promissory note at issue in 
anticipation of receiving such benefit. The record establishes that Bagley agreed 
to, and did, represent Ericlcson in his Chapter 12 bankruptcy proceeding, so 
Erickson received the benefit for which he bargained. Certainly, a party cannot 
execute a promissory note, let it default, and then escape the consequences of his 
promise by defending on the ground of laclc of consideration after he has received 
the benefit of his bargain. Thus, the promissory note does not lack consideration 
because Bagley gave consideration for the note when he agreed to represent 
Erickson in exchange for the note. (Emphasis added). 
Sirius LC v. Erickson, 144 Idaho 38,43. (2007). 
Sirius' position is misleading because Sirius makes it sound like Erickson moved for 
summary judgment challenging whether there was consideration for the promissory note 
and that this Court affirmed the district court's ruling in favor of Sirius. Thus, Sirius 
makes it sound like this Court has already ruled that consideration exists for the note. 
In reality, Erickson moved for summary judgment arguing that a third person 
could not provide consideration for a promissory note. Indeed, the facts are not in 
dispute that Sirius provided no consideration for the note. The issue before the district 
court and before this Court in Sirius Iinvolved whether Sirius could "borrow" 
consideration from Bagley. This Court precisely identified the issue as "whether a 
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pron~issory note is only enforceable if consideration for the note is provided by the 
promisee, or whether a note may be enforceable where consideration for the note is 
otherwise provided by a third person." Sirius LC v. Erickson, supra, 144 Idaho at 42. In 
the end, this Court held that a third person can provide consideration for a promissory 
note, i.e., Sirius could "borrow" consideration from Bagley even though Sirius had 
provided no consideration itself. 
Importantly, in Sirius I this Court reversed the trial court's decision granting 
Sirius summary judgment and denying Ericlson's motion to compel aimed at obtaining 
discovery on Erickson's affirmative defenses that included the "adequacy" or 
"sufficiency" of consideration. In an important footnote that Sirius fails to address, this 
Court stated: "In one of his affirmative defenses, Erickson alleges that there was 
'inadequate and insufficient consideration' to support the agreements. While we hold 
that Erickson received consideration for the note, we do not opine as to the adequacy of 
the consideration."' This Court then remanded for further proceedings on issues 
including the "adequacy" and "sufficiency" of the consideration. 
It is difficult to understand exactly how this Court could "hold that Erickson 
received consideration for the note," while leaving open on remand a possible finding of 
"inadequate and insufficient consideration." In retrospect, this Court should have 
phrased its wording a little differently to remove any confusion. It should have said, "We 
have determined that a third person can provide consideration for a promissory note. 
Bagley's agreeing to represent Erickson in the Chapter 12 is presumptive consideration 
for the Sirius promissory note. However, this Court cannot opine as to the adequacy or 
sufficiency of such consideration because the district court improperly denied Erickson 
' See Sirius LC v. Erickron, 144 Idaho 38,43 fn. 2 (2007). 
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any discovery in support of his affirmative defense of 'inadequate and insufficient 
consideration,' and that has precluded Erickson from submitting any evidence on this 
issue to rebut the presumption of consideration."' 
Unfortunately, this Court used language that has confused matters because this 
Court did not have before it the issue of whether Erickson had rebutted the presumption 
of consideration now before this Court. In Sirius I, Erickson asked this Court to decide 
the legal issue of whether a third person can provide consideration for a promissory note. 
This Court concluded that Bagley could provide consideration for the Sirius promissory 
note. However, Erickson did not ask this Court to decide the "adequacy" or "sufficiency" 
of Bagley's consideration because the district court had improperly denied Erickson any 
discovery on the consideration issue. Unfortunately, this Court's language on this 
consideration issue is incomplete, and Sirius now seizes on this to argue that this Court 
has conclusively determined that Bagley's agreeing to represent Erickson in the Chapter 
12 was "adequate" and "sufficient" consideration for the promissory note. 
ARGUMENT 
1. 
IT IS NOT THE LAW OF THE CASE THAT "ADEOUATE AND SUFFICIENT" 
CONSIDERATION EXISTS FOR THE PROMISSORY NOTE. 
Idaho Code Section 29-1 03 provides that "[a] written instmnent is presumptive 
evidence of a consideration." However, the party seeking to assert the defense of lack of 
consideration may rebut this presumption. Best Hill Coalition v. Hulko, LLC, 144 Idaho 
813,818 (2007). Idaho Code Section 29-104 specifies that '"tlhe burden of showing want 
It was only after remand that Erickson obtained any substantial discovery from Sirius. This means that 
when the district court improperly granted summary judgment to Sirius Erickson did not have all the 
written materials necessary to know the underlying facts relative to Bagley's representation of Erickson 
who also did not have Bagley's deposition. 
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of consideration sufficient to support an instrument lies with the party seeking to invalidate 
or avoid it." Id. (quoting Dennett v. Kuenzli, 130 Idaho 21,25 (Ct. App. 1997). "Under 
Idaho Code Section 29-104, both the burden of going forward with evidence and the burden 
of persuasion rest upon the party contesting the adequacy of the consideration." Id. 
Sirius claims that this Court has already held (therefore making it the law of the 
case) that consideration exists for the promissory note. Erickson has explained above that 
this Court really identified only "presumptive consideration" because the district court 
improperly precluded Erickson from conducting any discovery to test the "adequacy" or 
"sufficiency" of the presumptive consideration this Court identified and to rebut the 
presumption of consideration. This Court's footnote expressly reserves the issue of the 
"adequacy" of the consideration for determination on remand. 
If this Court had conclusively determined that Bagley had provided consideration for 
the promissory note, i.e., Bagley's agreeing to represent Erickson created an "irrebuttable 
presumption" rather than a "rebuttable presumption" of consideration, then this Court would 
not have remanded for Erickson to conduct discovery on the consideration issue and for the 
trial court to make a determination of the "adequacy" and "sufficiency" of the consideration. 
In short, the law of the case is not that "adequate and sufficient" consideration exists for the 
promissory note, but that Bagley's agreeing to represent Erickson in the Chapter 12 is 
presumptively valid consideration subject to Erickson's rebutting the consideration 
presumption and establishing the "inadequacy" or "insufficiency" of the consideration. 
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ERICKSON HAS CARRIED HIS BURDEN OF ESTABLISHING THAT 
BAGLEY'S PROMISE TO REPRESENT ERICKSON IN THE CHAPTER 12 
IS "INADEQUATE" OR "INSUFFICIENT" CONSIDERATION. 
In Sirius I, this Court stated that "the promissory note does not lack consideration 
because Bagley gave consideration for the note when he agreed to represent Erickson in 
exchange for the note." Sivius LC v. Erickson, supra, 144 Idaho at 43. This is the only 
consideration this Court found to support the promissory note, and it is the only 
consideration Sirius relies on to support the promissory note. However, for the reasons 
set forth below, this consideration is "inadequate" and "insufficient." 
"'[Wlant' or 'lack' of consideration . . . refers to instances where no consideration 
ever existed to support the contract, rendering the contract invalid from the beginning." 
World Wide Lease, Inc. v. Woodwovth, 11 1 Idaho 880,884 (Idaho Ct.App.1986). "An 
illegal contract is one that rests on illegal consideration consisting of any act or 
forbearance which is contrary to law or public policy. Generally, when the consideration 
for a contract explicitly violates a statute, the contract is illegal and unenforceable." 
Favrell v. Whiteman, 146 Idaho 604, 609 (2009) (citations omitted). "Whether a contract 
is illegal is a question of law for the court to determine from all the facts and 
circumstances of each case. The illegality of a contract can be raised at any stage in 
litigation. In fact, the court has the duty to raise the issue of illegality sua sponte." Id. at 
608. 
Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. Section 327, a bankruptcy trustee may employ only an 
attorney who "does not hold or represent an interest adverse to the estate and who is 
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di~interested."~ "The provisions of Section 327 are applicable to the professionals 
employed by a debtor in possession of a chapter 12 e~tate ."~ Finally, "[ulnder [I 1 
U.S.C.] Section 101(14), the Code defines a disinterested person as one that is not a 
creditor." These statutes prohibit an attorney from representing a Chapter 12 debtor in 
possession if that attorney holds an interest adverse to the estate-like a secured c red i t~r .~  
Here, the Chapter 12 bankruptcy court found that Bagley's promise to represent 
Erickson in the Chapter 12 explicitly violated 11 U.S.C. Section 327 and 11 U.S.C. 
Section 101(14) because Bagley through Sirius was a secured creditor and not a 
"disinterested" person of Erickson's e ~ t a t e . ~  Accordingly, the bankruptcy court 
disqualified Bagley from representing Erickson explaining that the bankruptcy court 
approved Bagley's application to represent Ericlcson only because of its own 
inadvertence authorizing him to represent Erickson in the first place.8 Bagley's promise 
to represent Ericltson in the Chapter 12 is "contrary to law or public policy" thus making 
it illegal and unenforceable because the law (grounded in sound public policy) forbade 
Bagley from representing Erickson in the Chapter 12 from the beginning. Erickson 
submits that an illegal and unenforceable promise is the same as "no consideration," "a 
want of consideration," "a lack of consideration," "inadequate consideration," or 
"insufficient consideration" rendering the note and mortgage invalid from the beginning. 
Accordingly, Erickson has rebutted the presumption of the validity of the consideration. 
See Erickson Exhibits D-156 through 157. 
See Erickson Exhibits D-156 through 157. 
See Erickson Exhibits D-156 through 157. 
' s e e  Erickson Exhibits D-156 through 157. 
7 ~ e e  Erickson Exhibits D-156 through 157. 
See Erickson Exhibits D-156 through 157. 
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111. 
THE LACK OF PERSONAL JURISDICTION OVER BAGLEY DOES NOT 
PRECLUDE ERICICSON FROM RAISING AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES AGAINST 
SIRIUS THAT INVOLVE BAGLEY'S CONDUCT. 
Sirius argues that Erickson has not sued Bagley as a third-party defendant and 
brought him within the jurisdiction of the court where Bagley can respond to the 
allegations of wrongful conduct. Sirius further argues that the court lacks personal 
jurisdiction over Bagley who cannot be brought into the case and therefore Erickson 
cannot raise any affirmative defenses dealing with Bagley's wrongful conduct. Sirius 
identifies no law in support of this argument that Erickson cannot raise any affirmative 
defenses for the reasons Sirius claims. 
As Sirius readily concedes, this is an action in equity to foreclose on a lien. Thus, 
the very nature of this case calls to mind '"[tlhe old equity maxim, 'that he who seeks 
equity must do equity. "' Hazard v. Cole, 1 Idaho 276 (1 869). It would be inequitable to 
allow Sirius to "borrow" Bagley's services as presumptive consideration for the 
promissory note without giving Erickson the ability to challenge the "adequacy" or 
"sufficiency" of that consideration or the ability to challenge whether Erickson is entitled 
to "just offsets" just because Bagley has structured the transaction to avoid personal 
jurisdiction. 
Moreover, Sirius' "claim" once belonged to Bagley who "redirected," "gave," 
"transferred," or otherwise "assigned" it to Sirius. This Court should construe the 
transaction between Bagley and Sirius as a contract in law for an assignment for the 
purposes of bringing about justice and equity thus invoking the familiar rule that 
Erickson has the same defenses against Sirius as he had against Bagley before Sirius got 
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the claim. Gray v. Tri- Way Const. Services, Inc., 147 Idaho 378 (2009); Foley v. Grigg, 
144 Idaho 530,532 (2007). Stated differently, Sirius "stands in the shoes" of Bagley and 
may assert those rights that Bagley could assert. Allowing Erickson to raise his 
affirmative defenses that involve Bagley's wrongful conduct does not require any 
personal jurisdiction over Bagley because Erickson does not seek any affirmative relief 
against Bagley like a judgment or an injunction. Erickson simply seeks to challenge 
Sirius' claim by testing Bagley's conduct. Accordingly, this Court can test Erickson's 
affirmative defenses involving Bagley's conduct irrespective of whether Bagley has 
submitted to personal jurisdiction. 
IV . 
NEITHER JUDICIAL ESTOPPEL NOR RES JUDICATA APPLY TO BAR 
ERICKSON'S AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES. 
Sirius melds the theories of judicial estoppel and res judicata together to argue that 
Erickson's affirmative defenses are barred. On the judicial estoppel issue, Sirius' brief is not 
entirely clear on how judicial estoppel actually applies thus causing Erickson to "divine" 
Sirius' theory. However, Sirius seems to claim that Erickson's Chapter 12 "failed to 
disclose the malpractice claims against Bagley or any other claim against him as an asset of 
the bankruptcy e~tate."~ Therefore, Erickson is now barred from raising these same claims 
by way of a defense. On the res judicata issue, Sirius argues that "[tlhe issue of malpractice 
or issues relating to the attorney fees of Bagley or other defenses to the Note and Mortgage 
should have been raised in the bankruptcy."'0 And since Erickson failed to do so, Erickson 
cannot raise these issues now. 
See Respondent's Brief, p. 17. 
' O  See Respondent's Brief, p. 20. 
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A. The Doctrine of Judicial Estouuel Does Not APD~Y To Bar Erickson's 
Affirmative Defenses. 
"The doctrine of judicial estoppel prohibits 'a party from assuming a position in 
one proceeding and then taking an inconsistent position in a subsequent proceeding."' 
Indian Springs, LLC v. Indian Springs Land Investment, LLC, 147 Idaho 737 (2009) 
(citations omitted). "Generally when a litigant, through sworn statements, 'obtains a 
judgment, advantage or consideration from one party, he will not thereafter, by 
repudiating such allegations and by means of inconsistent and contrary allegations or 
testimony, be permitted to obtain a recovery or a right against another party, arising out 
of the same transaction or subject matter."' Id. (emphasis added). This means that "the 
party asserting judicial estoppel must show that the sworn statement at issue was used to 
obtain a judgment, advantage, or consideration from another party." Id. (citing Loomis v. 
Church, 76 Idaho 87,93-94 (1954)). 
"Idaho courts may apply the doctrine [of judicial estoppel] even if the prior 
proceeding was a bankruptcy action." Riley v. W R. Holdings, LLC, 143 Idaho 1 16, 122 
(2006). However, judicial estoppel does not apply if the party asserting judicial estoppel 
fails to introduce any evidence that the party to be estopped ever obtained a "judgment, 
advantage, or consideration" from a sworn statement made during that bankruptcy action. 
Indian Springs, LLC v. Indian Springs Land Investment, LLC, supra, 147 Idaho at 737. 
Judicial estoppel further does not apply when the party to be estopped discloses to the 
bankruptcy court its claimed right to assert a post bankruptcy claim. Riley v. W R. 
Holdings, LLC, supra, 143 Idaho at 122. 
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Moreover, judicial estoppel does not apply when the banluuptcy court does not 
intend a party's actions in bankruptcy to preclude it from seeking a remedy in the courts 
of Idaho outside of the bankruptcy proceeding. Middlekauffv. Lake Cascade, Inc., 110 
Idaho 909 (1 986). This Court's holding and rational in Middlekauffare particularly 
instructive. In Middlekaufi this Court held that a prior bankruptcy proceeding in Florida 
did not support an estoppel in a subsequent Idaho action. This Court reasoned that "[tlhe 
[Florida] bankruptcy court apparently did not intend this action [the Florida bankruptcy 
action] to preclude the instant plaintiffs from seeking remedy in the courts of Idaho." 
Middlekauffv. Lake Cascade, Inc., supra, 1 10 Idaho at 91 5. 
Here, judicial estoppel does not apply because Sirius fails to show that Erickson 
obtained a "judgment, advantage, or consideration" in the Chapter 12 banlmptcy through 
means of a sworn statement and now has changed his position. Sirius claims that Erickson 
"failed to disclose the malpractice claims against Bagley or any other claim against him as 
an asset of the bankruptcy estate."" Importantly, Erickson does not argue that his claim of 
malpractice is an asset. Erickson is raising Bagley's malpractice as a defense to Sirius' 
claim. Moreover, Sirius makes no citation to the record for Erickson to determine whether 
Sirius is relying on a "sworn statement." In fact, Sirius has not cited to anything in the 
record to identify a "sworn statement" in which Erickson obtained a "judgment, advantage, 
or consideration." Nor does Sirius show that Erickson has changed a position contrary to a 
"sworn statement." Erickson is not asserting an affirmative claim against Sirius to obtain 
something from Sirius. Erickson is simply raising Bagley's malpractice as an affirmative 
defense to Sirius' claim at issue here. And Sirius has cited no law where judicial estoppel 
has ever prevented a party from raising an affirmative defense to a claim. 
" See Respondent's Brief, p. 17. 
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Also, judicial estoppel does not apply because Ericlcson did object to Bagley's note 
and mortgage in the Chapter 12 banlmptcy specifically challenging Bagley's attorney's fees 
underlying the note and mortgage. On July 18,2003, Erickson filed a MOTION FOR 
RELEASE OF MORTGAGE TO SECURE PAYMENT OF PROMISSORY NOTE TO 
SIRIUS LC." Erickson specifically requested that the bankruptcy court release the note and 
mortgage for the following reasons: 
1. "[TJhe claim of Sirius LC may be, in part, prepetition attorney's fees and 
costs incurred by the Debtor in the dissolution of marriage proceeding and 
the prior Chapter 11 case";I3 
2. "The debtor has never, in his lmowledge and belief, received an itemized 
- 
statement of prepetition fees or any other sum of money owed to Sirius 
LC";'~ 
3. Under the Debtor's Third Amended Chapter 12 Plan of Reorganization, 
"Sirius LC will [was supposed to] file a Proof Claim for the prepetition debt, 
itemized in detail the source of the debt";15 
4. The provisions of the "Third Amended Chapter 12 Plan of Reorganization 
were intended to provide Mr. Bagley the opportunity to file a proof of claim 
with the Bankruptcy Court so that the Debtor could review the debt allegedly 
owed to Sirius LC and make the appropriate  objection^";'^ and 
5. "Sirius LC has failed to file a proof of claim for the prepetition debt, 
itemizing in detail the source of the debt."17 
The bankruptcy court vacated the hearing on the motion and reset the matter for August 14, 
2003.18 At the hearing on August 14,2003, the bankruptcy court ruled that "the debtor must 
file an adversary [proceeding] if he wants to avoid the lien."I9 Thus, in the banluuptcy 
proceeding Erickson did in fact challenge Bagley's attorney's services for the note and 
l 2  Sirius' Exhibit 17. 
l 3  Sirius' Exhibit 17 paragraph 2. 
l 4  Sirius' Exhibit 17 paragraph 5. 
Is Sirius' Exhibit 17 paragraph 3. 
16 . . Slrlus' Exhibit 17 paragraph 6. 
l7 Sirius' Exhibit 17 paragraph 4. 
'' Sirius' Exhibit 17. 
l 9  Sirius' Exhibit IS. 
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mortgage. Erickson's position was clear &at Erickson never received an itemized statement 
for Bagley's attomey's fees, and Erickson wanted in detail the source of the debt to make 
the appropriate objections. 
However, rather than provide in detail the bankruptcy court with the source of the 
debt, and before Erickson's time to file an adversary complaint had even run in which 
Erickson could challenge the note and mortgage, Sirius filed this case in Caribou County 
on September 2,2004.~' Aware of this action pending in Caribou County, and as part of 
the banluuptcy court's discharge order dated August 29,2006, the bankruptcy court 
specifically ordered that Erickson is discharged from all debts except "the Sirius claim 
with a lawsuit pending in the District Court of the Sixth Judicial District of the State of 
Idaho, in and for the County of ~aribou."" In other words, the bankruptcy court 
recognized the jurisdiction of an Idaho court to resolve the issues raised in this case 
challenging Bagley's attorney's fees and specifically made provision in its order for this 
case thus making this case the equivalent of an adversary proceeding. 
In the end, Sirius has failed to introduce any evidence that Ericltson ever obtained 
a "judgment, advantage, or consideration" from a sworn statement made during 
Erickson's Chapter 12 bankruptcy proceeding and thereafter took a position inconsistent 
with that "sworn statement." Indian Springs, LLC v. Indian Springs Land Investment, 
LLC, supra, 147 Idaho at 737. Erickson disclosed to the Chapter 12 bankruptcy court his 
objection to Bagley's fees and claimed a right to assert his challenge to those fees post 
bankruptcy. Riley v. W R. Holdings, LLC, supra, 143 Idaho at 122. And the Chapter 12 
bankruptcy court intended that Erickson's challenge to the note and mortgage be resolved 
20 Tr VoI. I, p. I .  
2' Erickson's Exhibit "F." 
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in an Idaho court outside of the bankruptcy proceeding. Middlekauffv. Lake Cascade, 
Inc., supra, 110 Idaho at 909. Accordingly, judicial estoppel does not apply. 
B. The Doctrine of Res Judicata Does Not Apply To Bar Erickson's 
Affirmative Defenses. 
"'Res judicata is an affirmative defense and the party asserting it must prove all of 
the essential elements by a preponderance of the evidence."' C Systems, Inc. v. McGee, 
145 Idaho 559,562 (2008) (quoting Ticor Title Co. v. Stanion, 144 Idaho 119, 122 
(2007)). This Court recently declared that "in an action between the same parties upon 
the same claim or demand, the former adjudication concludes parties and privies not only 
as to every matter offered and received to sustain or defeat the claim but also as to every 
matter which might and should have been litigated in the first suit." Joyce v. Murphy 
Land and Irrigation Co., 35 Idaho 549,553 (1922). Thus, "a valid and final judgment 
rendered in an action extinguishes all claims arising out of the same transaction or series 
of transactions out of which the cause of action arose." Diamond v. Farmers Group, Inc., 
119 Idaho 146, 150 (1990). 
Here, Sirius argues that res judicata applies to preclude Erickson from 
challenging the note and mortgage because "[tlhe unchallenged order denying Erickson's 
motion challenging the validity of the Note and Mortgage became In other 
words, Sirius argues that the bankruptcy court's denial of Erickson's motion to release 
the mortgage precludes Erickson from challenging the validity of the note and mortgage 
in this action. 
However, the only "final judgment" in the bankruptcy court was the "discharge 
order" dated August 29,2006 which specifically ordered that Erickson is discharged from 
- 
22 See Respondent's Brief, p 20 
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all debts except "the Sirius claim with a lawsuit pending in the District Court of the Sixth 
Judicial District of the State of Idaho, in and for the County of ~aribou."~'  This "final 
judgment" expressly allows litigating the claims in this case rather than "extinguishing" 
the claims in this case. Accordingly, Sirius' argument regarding res judicata is without 
merit. 
Sirius relies on case law to argue that the issue of the validity of the note and 
mortgage fall within the bankruptcy court's "core jurisdiction"; therefore, Sirius argues 
Erickson was required to challenge the note and mortgage in the bankruptcy court, not 
Idaho state court. Sirius appears to confuse "core" jurisdiction with "exclusive" 
jurisdiction. Bankruptcy courts have jurisdiction over "core" proceedings. 28 U.S.C. 
157(b). However, "core" jurisdiction is not the same as "exclusive" jurisdiction. See, 
e .g ,  Hopkins v. Plant Insulation Co., 349 B.R. 805 (N.D. Cal. 2006) (holding "[nlothing 
in the language of section 1334 [28 U.S.C. 1334 gives original hut not exclusive 
jurisdiction to federal district courts in bankruptcy matters] suggests that state courts have 
been stripped of jurisdiction over core matters"). "Bankruptcy judges may hear and 
determine all cases under title 11 and all core proceedings arising under title 11 ." 28 
U.S.C. 157(b) (emphasis added). Under the express language of the statute, the 
bankruptcy court's "core" jurisdiction is discretionary, not "exclusive." Therefore, 
Erickson was not required to challenge the validity of the note and mortgage exclusively 
in the bankruptcy court. 
In reality, the August 29,2006 discharge order is tantamount to the Chapter 12 
bankruptcy court's exercise of discretion in abstaining from hearing the issues contained 
in this case and allowing these issues to proceed in the Idaho court system. In re Krug, 
23 Erickson's Exhibit "F." 
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF ON APPEAL - Page 16 
F:\CLENTS\BDS\7453Wjeadings\O77 Reply Brief on Appeal.doc 
172 B.R. 79 (Bkrtcy.D.Kan. 1994). Banlcruptcy courts have discretion to abstain when to 
do so promotes the interests of justice, the interests of comity with the state court, or out 
of respect for state law. Id. Sirius has not shown that the bankruptcy court abused its 
, 
discretion. 
C. None Of Sirius' Miscellaneous Arguments A ~ p l v  To Preclude Ericlcson 
From Challenging The Note And Mortgage In This Case. 
Sirius makes several flawed and disconnected arguments in relation to its res 
judicata argument that Erickson cannot challenge the note and mortgage in this case. For 
example, Sirius claims that Erickson's stipulation at the beginning of trial was an 
agreement that the numbers and calculations were "correct" and therefore beyond dispute 
in the final analysis. However, the stipulation was that Erickson did not dispute certain 
items relating to the promissory note, such as the amount of the note ($29,173.38), 
Erickson had signed the note, Erickson had made no payments on the note, etc. There 
was no need to take any evidence on these issues. Importantly, the stipulation was not 
that the numbers and calculations were "correct in the final analysis," but that they were 
primafacie correct and subject to Erickson's affirmative defenses. 
Sirius argues that "Erickson testified that his Marital Settlement Agreement with 
his former wife provided that he would pay the attorney fees to Mr. ~ a ~ l e ~ . ' " ~  This 
statement is irrelevant to the res judicata issue because the note and the mortgage provide 
that Ericltson would pay attorney fees to Bagley through Sirius. Oddly, the Marital 
Settlement Agreement says that Erickson would pay $24,000 attorney's fees whereas the 
note and mortgage say that Erickson would pay $29,173.38 attorney's feesz5 In any 
event, Erickson's recognition that the Marital Settlement Agreement provided that 
24 See Respondent's brief, p. 21 
25 See Plaintiff's Exhibit 3 .  
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Erickson would pay $24,000 attorney fees to Bagley does not satisfy the elements of res 
judicata, 
Sirius argues that "Erickson was represented by an independent attorney during 
the divorce proceeding and admits that he reviewed tke settlement with that attorney."26 
Sirius does not cite to the record to support this assertion. However, Erickson actually 
testified as follows: 
"Q. And to the best of your knowledge, this document was reviewed by your 
attorney and by Mrs. Erickson's attorney? 
A. My attorney, yes, and I don't know about her attorney."27 
The record reveals that Erickson's divorce attorney reviewed Exhibit "B" to the Marital 
Settlement ~ ~ r e e m e n t . ' ~  Exhibit "B" simply identified the amount Bagley then claimed 
Erickson owed as attorney's fees. The record does not reveal that the divorce attorney 
ever reviewed anything with Erickson but just that the divorce attorney reviewed Exhibit 
"B" himself. This is not a proper application of res judicata nor does Erickson's actual 
testimony even support Sirius' theory. 
Sirius argues that Erickson received the benefit in the divorce case for having 
assumed $24,000 in debt to Bagley and that Erickson would be receiving a windfall if 
Erickson were now allowed to claim that Bagley's attorney's fees are ~nreasonable .~~ 
Whether Erickson received a windfall in the divorce is a matter between Erickson and his 
former wife. Moreover, there is no evidence that the divorce debt was equitably 
distributed in the first place. This argument is also not a proper application of ves 
judicata. 
2G See Respondent's brief, p. 21; emphasis added. 
27 See Tr Vol. 11, p. 45, LL. 13-15. 
28 See Plaintiffs Exhibit 3. 
29 See Respondent's brief, pp. 21-22. 
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Sirius argues that Bagley fully disclosed the amount of his attorney's fees to 
Erickson in his Wyoming office and that Erickson and Bagley agreed the amount was 
correct.30 Sirius appears to argue that the doctrine of res judicata precludes Erickson 
from now challenging Bagley's attorney's fees underlying the note and mortgage. Again, 
this is not a proper application of the doctrine of res judicata. Moreover, Erickson does 
not dispute that he agreed in the note and mortgage to pay Bagley $29,173.38 in 
attorney's fees; however, Erickson's promise to pay is subject to his affirmative defenses. 
Sirius makes two remaining arguments. First, Sirius claims that Bagley's legal 
representation allowed for the time necessary to complete the ultimate goal of gaining 
time to sell the real property.3' To the contrary, the ultimate goal of Bagley's legal 
representation was to have a bankruptcy plan confirmed. And Bagley's legal 
representation fell far short having resulted in a dismissal for lack of prosecution. 
Moreover, if this Court were to accept Bagley's claim that he filed the Chapter 11 just to 
"buy time," rather than to get a plan confirmed, then this Court would have to question 
whether Bagley filed the Chapter 11 in "good faith" or "bad faith" within the meaning of 
what practitioners call "Rule 1 1 ." 
Second, Sirius argues that Bagley's attorney's fees were comparable to those Ms. 
Shivley charged for her work in the Chapter 12.~' However, Ms. Shively's legal 
representation resulted in a confirmed Chapter 12 plan that Erickson successfully 
completed and received an order of discharge whereas Bagley's legal representation 
resulted in a failed and dismissed Chapter 11. Because there is no comparison between 
the nature of Ms. Shively's representation and the nature of Bagley's representation (the 
See Respondent's brief, p. 22. 
" See Respondent's brief, p. 22. 
32 See Respondent's brief, p. 22. 
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results are like night and day), Sirius' argument that Bagley's fees were "comparable" is 
really evidence that Bagley's attorney's fees are unreasonable. 
v. 
SlKII.'S l'A1LS ?'O SIIOW B.IGLEY - (:O.VPLIED - -- N'ITH WSO\fING K U L l  OF 
I'KOI'I:SSION:\I. CONDUCT 11UI.13 l,X(a) TIIAT PliOlIlBI'I'S 'TlIIS 
. . - - -. -- - -  - 
"TRANSACTION." 
> 
Erickson claims that the trial court should have ruled as a matter of law in favor of 
Ericltson because Bagley violated Wyoming Rule of Professional Conduct I .8(a) in 
entering a business transaction and taking a security interest in Erickson's property 
without complying with the terms of Rule 1.8(a). Since filing his Opening Brief on 
appeal, Erickson has found yet another case to support his argument on this issue. See 
Hawkv. State Bar, 45 Cal.3d 589, 598,601, 754 P.2d 1096, 1101, 1102 (1988) ("We 
conclude that an attorney who secures payment of fees by acquiring a note secured by a 
deed of trust in the client's property has acquired an interest adverse to the client, and so 
must comply with the requirement of rule 5-101" which provided, "in pertinent part, that 
'[a] member of the State Bar shall not enter into a business transaction with a client or 
knowingly acquire an ownership, possessory, security or other pecuniary interest adverse 
to a client' unless specified safeguards are followed"'). 
In an attempt to avoid this Court's finding that the note and mortgage are 
unenforceable as violative of Rule 1.8, Sirius argues that "Sirius is not subject to the 
assertion that violation of an ethics rule by an outside party [Bagley] somehow voids the 
Note and ~ o r t g a ~ e . " ~ ~  This argument demonstrates the danger of allowing Sirius to 
obtain the benefit of relying on Bagley's consideration without making the note subject to 
judging Bagley's conduct under Rule 1.8. Sirius would have this Court rule that Bagley's 
33 See Respondent's Brief, p. 25 
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wrongful conduct that would otherwise make the note and mortgage unenforceable is 
somehow sanitized just because Bagley "redirected" or "assigned" his claim to payment 
to Sirius. If this Court were to adopt this argument, then a lawyer could always avoid a 
malpractice setoff argument from his client by having each client at the commencement 
of representation agree to pay the attorney's wholly owned corporation or limited liability 
company rather than the attorney. If the client fails to pay, and the attorney's entity were 
to sue to recover the attorney's fees, the client would not be able to assert the attorney's 
malpractice as a setoff effectively insulating the attorney from his own malpractice. 
In an effort to "identify" independent counsel, Sirius argues that Erickson's 
divorce attorney "reviewed the fee charged by Bagley and included a provision for its 
payment as a secured debt in the Divorce ~e t t lement . "~~ While it is true that the Divorce 
Settlement identifies a secured debt to Bagley in the amount of $24,000 (not $29,173.38 
lilce the note in this case), it is not true that the record supports Sirius' claim that 
Erickson's divorce attorney "reviewed the fee charged by Bagley." Any fair reading of 
the record is that Erickson's attorney was aware of the fee Bagley charged and reviewed 
Exhibit "B" to the Marital Settlement Agreement identieing the fee amount, not that he 
reviewed the reasonableness of Bagley's fee.35 Moreover, under Rule 1.8(a), 
independent counsel would need to review the "terms of the transaction," not just the 
amount of attorney's fees Bagley charged. Exhibit "B" to the Marital Settlement 
Agreement contains none of the terms of the transaction, such as the proper amount of the 
note, the terms of the note, the mortgage, a property description, etc. Thus, the record is 
3 4 ~ e e  Respondent's Brief, p. 25. 
"See  Tr Vol. 11, p. 45, LL. 7-19; see also Plaintiffs Exhibit 3. 
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devoid of evidence that the divorce attorney could have reviewed the terms of the 
transaction with Erickson. 
Sirius states that "[tlhe trial judge determined that Erickson was represented by an 
independent attorney and that the he had reviewed with that attorney the fact that the debt 
involving attorney fees would be secured."36 This is contrary to the court's actual finding 
number 12 where the court found "Mr. Erickson did not retain independent counsel as 
to whether he should sign the note however he did have his divorce attorney review the 
fees."37 In other words, the trial court found that Erickson did not have independent 
counsel to advise him whether he should sign the note, i.e., whether the "terms of the 
transaction" were "fair and reasonable" as Rule 1.8(a) requires. Instead, the trial court 
found that Erickson's divorce attorney "reviewed the fees." As explained above, the 
record shows that the divorce attorney was aware of the attorney's fees Bagley charged 
and reviewed Exhibit "B" to the Marital Settlement Agreement that identified the amount 
of those fees. Importantly, the record contains no evidence that Ericltson's divorce 
attorney reviewed the attorney's fees Bagley charged to determine whether they were 
"fair and reasonable." 
Sirius mistakenly relies on Comment 4 to Rule 1.8 to argue compliance with Rule 
1.8. Neither Comment 4 to Rule 1.8 nor anything like it appears in the Wyoming Rules 
of Professional Conduct as they were published in 1 9 9 9 . ~ ~  Thus, Comment. 4 to Rule 1.8 
did not even exist at the applicable time. Sirius appears to rely on a later edition of Rule 
See Respondent's Brief, p. 25. 
37 See R Vol. 11, p. 130; emphasis added. 
See Addendum "A" to this Reply Brief on Appeal. Addendum "A" is a courtesy copy of Rule 1.8 and 
the Comments thereto as they existed in Wyoming in 1999. Since 1999, Model Rule 1.8 has been modified 
and comments have been added more than once. It appears Sirius is relying on Comment 4 to Rule 1.8 that 
did not even exist in 1999 but has been added since then as Rule 1.8 has been modified. 
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1.8 to find Comment 4. In any event, the Comment states that "[iJf the client is 
independently represented in the transaction, paragraph (a)(2) of this Rule is inapplicable, 
and the paragraph (a)(l) requirement for full disclosure is satisfied either by a written 
disclosure by the lawyer involved in the transaction or by the client's independent 
counsel." 
Here, the trial court specifically found that Erickson had independent counsel in 
the divorce but "Erickson did not retain independent counsel as to whether he should sign 
the note," i.e., Erickson did not have independent counsel to advise him whether he 
should enter the "transaction." Thus, paragraphs (a)(2) and (a)(l) are still applicable, and 
Bagley did not comply with them. Also, even if paragraph (a)(l)'s requirement for full 
disclosure could be satisfied either by a written disclosure by the lawyer involved in the 
transaction or by the client's independent counsel, neither Bagley nor the divorce 
attorney provided any written disclosure regarding the transaction. 
Sirius argues that Erickson testified he had a "full understanding of the Note and 
Here is what the record reflects: 
"You knew what a promissory note was, didn't you? 
Yes. 
You know it was an obligation to repay money? 
Yes. 
You also knew what a security agreement was? 
Yes. 
You knew what a mortgage was? 
Yes. 
You had a full understanding of those things when you signed the note and 
mortgage in this case? 
I had a full understanding then of them and also had full trust in Mr. 
Bagley there."40 
39 See Respondent's Brief, p. 25. 
40 See Tr Vol. 11, p. 50, L. 18 through p. 5 1, L. 4 
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF ON APPEAL - Page 23 
F:\CLIENTS\BDS\7453\Pleadings\077 Reply Brief on Appeal.doc 
Thus, Erickson testified that his "full understanding" was that a promissory note required 
him to repay money and that a mortgage was a security agreement. Erickson's "full 
understanding" was not whether the "terms of the transaction" were "fair and 
reasonable." Moreover, Ericltson's "full understanding" was also based on the misplaced 
trust he had in Bagley. 
Sirius raises other issues with respect to Rule 1.8 that are irrelevant. For example, 
Sirius argues that Erickson did not file an action against Bagley in the bankruptcy court, 
in a Wyoming court, a third party claim, or file a complaint against Bagley with the 
Wyoming Bar Association. Erickson will not file an ethical claim with the Wyoming Bar 
Association until this action is over to avoid the appearance of trying to use a government 
tribunal to gain an advantage in this litigation. Erickson cannot file a third party claim 
against Bagley because Idaho lacks personal jurisdiction over Bagley. And Erickson has 
not filed any action against Bagley in the bankruptcy court or a Wyoming court because 
the issues are being litigated in this court. Finally, Sirius notes that Erickson had no 
complaint with Bagley's representation of him in the Chapter 12 proceeding. This 
statement is true given that the Chapter 12 bankruptcy court disqualified Bagley from 
representing Erickson in the Chapter 12 proceeding before he effected any damage. 
In the end, Sirius has identified no evidence in the record that Bagley complied 
with all the requirements of Rule 1.8(a). Specifically, Rule 1 .&'(a) required that Bagley 
"fully disclose" the "transaction and terms" and "transmit" this "full disclosure" in 
"writing" to Erickson. Rule 1.8(a) further required that Erickson "consent in writing" to 
these terms. Nowhere does Sirius show that Bagley complied with these two writing 
requirements--no "full disclosure transmitted in writing" and no "consent in writing." 
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Accordingly, the evidence is undisputed that Bagley entered a "transaction" that Rule 
1.8(a) expressly "prohibited." 
THE TRIAL COURT STATED THAT IT WAS "IMPRESSED" 
\VI TtI AIS. SHIVELY'S "BAC'KGRO~I\'D AND 11ER A-\UII.I'I'Il~S'' IND 
TIIEN -- IINEXI'LICABLY ICiiSOllEI) -. - 11EH - TES'I'IhlONY. .- . -. -
Sirius justifies the trial court's ignoring Ms. Shively's testimony and attacks Ms. 
Shively's handling of the Chapter 12 making various statements without any citation to 
the r e~o rd .~ '  All these attacks are untrue, misleading, and/or irrelevant. For example, 
Sirius states that "[tlhe bankruptcy court ordered Erickson to file an 'adversary 
proceeding' in order to challenge the Mortgage" but provides no citation to the record.42 
In reality, the Chapter 12 bankruptcy court's ruling was that "[ilf mortgage lien is a 
preference, the debtor must file an adversary if he wants to avoid the lien."43 The 
Chapter 12 bankruptcy court did not order Erickson to file an adversary proceeding as 
Sirius suggests. In any event, the attorney's fees Ms. Shively charged, how she litigated 
the Chapter 12, and what she may or may not have advised are all irrelevant. 
Although the trial court did find that Ms. Shively was an "interested witness," the 
trial court cited no facts in the record to support this finding.44 To the contrary, the 
record establishes that the trial court was impressed with Ms. Shively and in fact made 
the following statement to counsel for Erickson during Ms. Shively's examination: "Ask 
her for her testimony. Let her give her reasons why. She is competent. Z m n  impressed 
" See Respondent's brief, pp. 22-23 
" See Respondent's brief, p. 23. 
43 See Plaintiffs Exhibit 18. 
44 See RVol. 11, p. 132. 
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with her background and her abilities. Let her give her testimony."45 It is enigmatic for 
Erickson why the trial court would later ignore Ms. Shively's testimony regarding 
Bagley's conduct in the Chapter 11 proceeding when the trial court admitted that it was 
"impressed with her background and her abilities." Erickson submits that any bias 
associated with Ms. Shively's testimony did not emanate from Ms. Shively. 
VII. 
ERICKSON HAS NOT WAIVED HIS OBJECTIONS TO ALLOWING 
BAGLEY TO TESTIFY AS AN EXPERT. 
Sirius argues that Erickson has waived any objection to the expert testimony of 
Bagley because Erickson took Bagley's deposition before trial. However, before 
Erickson took Bagley's deposition as a fact witness, Erickson had served specific written 
discovery asking Sirius to identify all experts, their opinions, and the bases for their 
opinions.46 Sirius never disclosed any of this information. This meant that Erickson was 
unable to explore in deposition Bagley's opinions and the bases for his opinions he 
intended to offer at trial. Although Bagley answered some questions in the form of his 
opinion, this is no substitute for questioning Bagley on the opinions he intended to offer 
at trial and the bases for his opinions. This is especially true here where Erickson 
questioned Bagley believing that he would not be an expert at trial and where Erickson 
specifically had requested the information in discovery to prepare for any expert 
deposition. It is illogical that Erickson waived any objection to allowing Bagley to testify 
as an expert by taking his deposition because Erickson did not even know that Bagleg 
intended to testify as an expert. Erickson cannot waive something he does not even laow 
about. 
"See Tr Vol. 11, p. 128, LL. 5-7; emphasis added. 
46 See R Vol. 11, pp. 30-3 1. 
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BAGLEY'S REPRESENTING KATHLEEN WHILE ALSO REPRESENTING 
ERICKSON WAS "MATERIALLY ADVERSE" TO ERICKSON. 
Sirius argues that Bagley did not have a conflict representing Kathleen while also 
representing Erickson because such representation was not "materially adverse" to 
Erickson. In other words, such representation may have been "adverse," just not 
"materially adverse." However, Bagley testified that Erickson wanted to retain 
possession of the farm whereas Kathleen did not want to.47 Erickson wanted to save his 
farm and continue to farm whereas Kathleen wanted to sell the farm and divide the 
cash.48 This conflict is "materially adverse" to Ericltson because the whole purpose of a 
Chapter 11 plan is reorganize the debtor's business. Bagley had one client (Kathleen) 
saying she wanted to reorganize by liquidating, and Bagley had the other client 
(Erickson) saying he wanted to reorganize by retaining as much of the farm as possible. 
Bagley could not liquidate "the farm" and at the same time keep "the farm." Erickson 
again submits that Bagley could represent both Erickson and Kathleen at the same time 
only if Kathleen and Erickson had an agreement on how to divide their property. That 
agreement did not come until Kathleen and Erickson signed the Marital Settlement 
Agreement on October 12, 1999. 
CONCLUSION 
For all the reasons set forth in his Opening Brief and this Reply Brief, Erickson 
respectfully requests that the court reverse the judgment entered against Erickson and 
remand to the district court for further handling. 
47 See Bagley Depo., 17:Z-18.1. 
48 See Tr Vol. 11, p. 22, LL. 11-21; see Bagley Depo., p. 17, L. 10 through p. 18, L. 1 
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF ON APPEAL -Page 27 
F:\CLIENTS\BDS\7453Wleadings\O77 Reply Brief on Appeal.doc 
DATED this / ~ & f i m u a u y ,  2010. 
SMITH, DRISCOLL &ASSOCIATES, PLLC , 
Attorneys for PlaintiffIAppeIlant 
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ADDENDUM "A" 
PAX NU, 3U'1'1'1'1'124U P, 01 
WYOMING COURT RULES 696 
atsndard for the suprema court t o  follow when Applisd in Bowen v. Smith, 838 P.2d 186 
reviewing the denial or grant of a motion to (Wyo. 1992); CSP v. DDC. 842 P,Zd 520 (Wyo. 
disqualify nn attorney under thia rule is a8 19921. 
followc (1) The decision to r a n t  or deny a Steted in Parker v. Artery, 889 P.2d 520 
motion to diaqualii9 counarl is within the dia- (Wyo. 1996). 
cmtion of the trial oourt (2) The moving party Cited in Swuel p. Zamrin, 868 R2d 266 
has the burden of establishing pounds for (Wyo. 1904). 
dLsquali6c;itlon (9) The god of tha court should Law reviewe. - Por article, "Mediation and 
ba to #hap8 a remedy which will assure fkitness Wyoming Domeptic Relations Cassa - Racti- 
to  the partie8 and the integrity of the judicial c ~ l  Considerations, Ethical Concerns and Pro- 
proceea (4) Wbanever pussible, courts should poposed #tandnrds of Practice," see XXVlI Land 
endeavor to reach P solution that is least bur. & water L. Rev. 456 (1992). 
densome to the client. Rose v. Rase, 849 P.2d 
1321 (Wyo. 199s). 
Rule 1.8. Conffict ofinterestr prohibited transaotioas. 
(a) A lawyar shaii not e n k r  into a husinesa transaction with a client or knowingly 
acquire an ownership, possessory. ,security or other pecuniaq interest advertle to a 
client unleail: 
(1) the t.rantaction and tormv on which the lawyer acquires the interest are fair 
and reasonable to the client and are fully disclosed and transmitted in writing to 
the client in a manner whiol~ can be reasonably understood by the clienk 
(2) the client is given w reasonable opportunity to Reek the advice of independent 
come1 in the trnnsaction; 
(S) the client consents in writing thereto. 
6) Except as otherwise provided in Rule 1.6, a lawyer slmll not make uae of 
knowledge or information acquired by him through his professional relationship with 
his client or in the conduct of his client's buliiness to the advantage or profit of himself 
or a third person, which is to the disadvantage of the client, unless the client consents 
afker consultstion. 
(c)  Alawyer shall not prepare an instntment givinpthe lawyer or a person related to 
the lawyer an parent, child, sibling, or spoune any &ubstantiai gift fram a client, 
including a tostamenrary gift, eycept where the client is related to the done@. 
(d) Prior to the concl~iaion of representation of a client., a lawyer ahall not make or 
negotiate an agreement giving the lawyer literary or media rights to a portrayal or 
account baaed in subbtantial part on information relating to the representation. 
(el A lawyer shall not provide linilnei~l assistance to a client in connection with 
pending o r  contemplated iieipation, except that: 
(1) a lawyer may advanoo court costs and expanses of litigation, the repayment 
of which may be contingent on the outcome c r f  the matter: and 
(2'1 a Iawyer repreventing an indigent client may p p y  court cost# and expenses of 
litigation on behalf of chc? client. 
(O Alawyer shall not accept compensation for representing a client from one other 
t h m  the chent unless: 
(1) the pliant consents after consultation; 
(2) there is no inttirference with the iawycr'~ independence of profeasionai 
judgment or with the client-lawyer relatiolrfihip; and 
(3) information relnting to representation of a client is protected as required by 
Rule 1.6. 
(E) A kla~ye? who represents two (2) or more clients shall not participate in ~naking 
an aggregate settlement of the claims of or against the clients, or in a crinlinal caae an 
aggregated agreement as to guilty or nolo contendere plew~, unless each client cbnsenru 
aRer coneultation, including disclosure of the exi*tcnce and nature of ail the ilairns or 
pleas involvod and of the participation of each person in the settlement. 
(h) A lawyer shall not make at, ameemc!nt prospectively limiting tho lawyer,h 
Liability to a client for malprudioe unless permitted by law and the clicnt is indrpen- 
I'RX NU. 3U'1'1'111240 P, 02 
!n v. Smith, 838 P,Zd 186 
DDC, &I% P.24 628 fWw. 
r r Artery, 889 P.2d 520 
v. Zwerin, 868 P2d 265 
For anicle, 'Mediation and 
ReIationa Calisa - Pradi- 
Ethical Concerns and Pro- 
Practice," see XXVlI Land 
' (1082). 
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! dently represented in making the agreement, or settle a claim for such liability with an 
unrepreaented client or former client without first advising that person in writing that 
independent representation is  appropriate in connection therewith. 
(i) A lawyer related to another lawyer as parent, child, ~ i b h g ,  or spouse shall not 
' represent a client in a representation directiy adverse to a person who the lawyer knows 
is represented by the other lawyer except upon consent by the dient after consultation 
regarding the relationship. 
(j) A lawyer shall not acquire a proprietary interest in the cauae of action ar subject 
matter ofliGgaticn the lawyer i s  conducting for a client, except that the lawyer may: 
(1) acquire a lien granted by law to Becure the lawyer's fee or expenses; and 
(2) contract with a client for a reasonabIe contingent fee in a civil case. 
Comment. - ??ansae~iuns Between Client rand Lawyer: I11 As a general 
principle, all transactions between client and lawyer shouid be fair and 
reasonable to the client. In such transactions a review by independent counsel 
on behalf of the client is offen advisable. Furthermore, a lawyer may ~ o t  use 
information relating to the reprebentation to hia advantage which is to the 
&ant's disadvantage. For exampie, a lawyer who has learned that the client is 
investing in specific real estate may not, without the dient's con~ent, seek to 
acquire nearby property where doing so would adversely affect the client's plan 
for investment. Paragraph (a) doe8 not, however, apply to sCandard commercial 
tranaactions between the lawyer and the client for ~roducts or services that the 
client generally markets to others, for example, banking or brokerage Services, 
medical  service^, products manufactured or distributed by the client, and 
utilities services. In such transactions, the lawyer has no ~dvantage in dealing 
with the client, and the rest>.ictions in paragraph fa) are unnecessary and 
impractic~ble. 
f2i A lawyer may accept a gifi from a client, if the transaction meets general 
standards of fairnerrrr. For example, a simple gift such as a present given at a 
holiday or na a taken of appreciation ie permiged. If effectuation of a 
substnntial gift requires preparing a hgal instrument such as a will or 
conveyance, however, the client ahould have the detached advice that another 
lawyer can provide. Parr,bwaph (c) recognizes an exwption where the client is 
a relative of the donee or the gift is not Auhstantial. 
Literary Aights. 131 An agreomrnt by which a lawyer acquire$ literary or 
media rightfi concerning the conduct of the repreeentation ereawn a conflict 
between tho interesb of th e client and the personal intereats of ihe lawyer, 
Measurea suitable in the represenmion of the client may detmcl. from the 
publication value of an account of the repreaentation, Paragraph (d) does not 
prohibit a lawyer reprewentine a client in a transaction concerning iiterary 
property from agreeing that the lawyer's fee shall consist of a share in 
ownership in the property, if che arrangement conforms to Ruln 1.5 and 
paragraph (i). 
Person Paying f~rLuk~.y:yrr%Seruices. 141 Rule 1.8(f) requires diuclosurcr ofthe 
fact that the lawyer's sfrvices are boing paid for by x third pnrty. Such an 
arrangemonc must also confor~n to the requiremente of Rule 1.6 concerning 
confidentiality and Rule 1.7 concerning confiicc of intereat. Whert! khe client is 
a class, consent may be obtainad on behalf of the class by cou1.r-eupcrvised 
procedure. 
Furrzily Rebtionahips Ertrueen Low.yers. 151 Rule 1.8(i) appjies to rutsited 
lawyara who are in different firms. Related lawyers in the same fitm are 
governed by Rules 1.7, 1.9, and 1.10. The disquaiification statad in  Rul(4 1,8(i) 
iR personal and is not irnprtted to members ol'firms with whom the ixwyerti are 
sbmciated. 
p t l ~  p i i l .  3L I 1 1 1 (24U 
Rule 1.9 WYOMING COURT RUI*ES 693 
A c y ~ i s ~ l r o n  f Interest an Liti~utio,t. [61 Paragraph 61 states the traditional 
general nde that iarvyer~ arc prohibited from acquiring 8 proprietary l n t e r ~ s t  
ix litigation This rule, which has  its basis in common law champert .~ 
and maintenance, is aubject to specific exceptions developed in decisional I - r  
and continued in thase Rules, such aa the  ~rceptron fur realionable contingent 
fees se t  fonh  in Hule 1.5 and the exception for cenain advances of the  codts af 
litigation sec forch in paragraph (e) .  
[71 This Rule is not intended to a p ~ l y  to customary qualification and 
I~rnitntione in logal opinions and memoranda. 
Soliciting and obtaining loans h.om cll. mrnt on her hehalf, the atwrney violated this 
ants. -An attorney, by soliciting and obtain- rule. Grievmcu Comm, v. Rtner, 765 P.2d 925 
ing lwrna from iua client, entered into u busi- (LlCyo 1968). 
neru relauonahip with hia client in which the Am. Ju.. 2d, ALR ~d C.J.S. rehreaaes. 
attorney and hie client had diffenns interebta. - Attr.mefs nswrtion of rrtsining lien as 
By failing to edvlsr. h e  client to arek indepen- violation of erhic;l code or rules governing 
dent legal advicc, by failing to advise his client pmfe~sionoi conduct. 69 ALR4th 974. 
of the nsk; und disadvantages of losuing 
~t torneys  retaining 11sn: whnt i t ~ r n s  uf cli- 
money without mmiving proper cnllntarnl ent.& properly nr funds sre not subject M lien, 
therefor. by fniling to odvlse his client of hie 70 A L R , ~ ~  827 financinl cociduioa, tlnd by f~iling to obrair. her ~ , ~ ~ , ~ l j ~ ~  &.sinst 
co~lsent after full disclosura snd when hie client lo.,, from eii,,nt, 9 A J . R G ~ ~  103, 
expuct~d him to exercise hia profcarionel judg- 
Rule 1.9. Conflict of interest: former client. 
(a) A lawyer who has formerly rrpresruted u. client in n rnatror ;ihail not thereufirrr 
reprenent another per3un in the Hame or a scbscar~!.inlly related matter in which that  
person's interesb are mnterially adversa ro the internfits of tho former rlier~t unless the  
former clibnt consents nfcer consulration except lhnt when the former cliant 1.3 a 
governmental entity, conrent is nor i,emitthd. 
(b)  A lawyer shall not knowingly represent ii person in the same or a slrbsrantially 
related matcfr in *11ich a firm with which the Ic,\vycr formerly W ~ H  assoc~~ired h3d 
previuusly rrpresmted a client whose interests are matanslly advnrde to char person 
ant1 about whom the lawyer had acquired informction protected by Rules 1 6 and 1.9(cl 
that id materinl to the matter, uniesa the  former rlienr consents after ~onsultatioil 
(cJ A lawyer who has  furmerly represented a cltent in a ':,alter or whose present or 
furmer firm has  furmorly reprefiented a client rn u matter shall not thereafter: 
(1, Use infomiatiun relating to the represcr~tarion to the  disndvnnrago of the 
former client except ua Rulo 1.6 or Rule 3.3 w o ~ l d  permit or require with respect to 
R client (lr wlten the inlbrmat2on has become ,ncnrrallv known; or 
(2)  Revefil infurm~~tion relating to tho rrpresontiltiun except a8 Rub 1 6 o r  Rule 
3.3 wor~lrl permit or requbre with respctt tu a clionr. 
Comment. - 111 After t e rmina t i~n  of a client-lawyer relationeh~p, a lawyer 
may not represent another client except in oontbrrnily w ~ t h  thiq Rule. The 
principles in Rulo 1.7 determine ~vhetho. r l ~ e  inrrrrut; QF the present ar.d 
former client are adverse. Thua, a lrtwyer ~c,ti ld not properly seek to rescind on 
bekalrof a new rlirrnt a cortract drafted on bellall of the  liurmer client. So d l . ~  
u lawyer who has pmaecu:ed an accuhed pr.rion could not properly reprpcen! 
theaccused in a sub6eyuent civil action ngntrst itit. covcrnmenr concernin& Lhe 
Yamn l ransnct~or~.  
I21 The scopt uf s "matter" for purpows ~f thia IKulc rsrty depend un the :acts 
of a p a n ~ c u l a r  a~tuation or transaztiot.. 'The lawyer's ~ovulvcrnmr in a rntbtter 
can alsd be a qutsrion of degree. U h a t ~  a !.I> ytr  na$ b r m  diroctly involve:i In 
a specific trannactton, tiulaoquent roprrae.iturion of otnrr cilents ra.,lth Lnzrc.t?- 
nlly adverde interests clehrly i* prohih~Lr0 On !.he otnt., hand, a lawycr m h u  

